INTRODUCTION
When providing health insurance for employees, most businesses have similar goals: obtain the broadest coverage with the finest care for the lowest cost. So pervasive are these goals that many health insurance companies specifically emphasize them in an attempt to attract new clients. Michigan's largest health insurance agency, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan ("Blue 1 Cross Blue Shield"), is no exception to this generalization. On its website, Blue Cross Blue Shield specifically states that its "unique vision and mission" is to provide its members with "higher quality health care" and "lower health care costs" from " [t] he largest network of doctors and hospitals in the state." 2 Attempting to deliver on these promises, Blue Cross Blue Shield began using a contract provision called a Most Favored Nation Clause ("MFN") in its agreements with Michigan health care providers. These provisions guaranteed 3 Blue Cross Blue Shield's clients the most competitive prices in the health care industry by requiring hospitals and other health care providers to grant Blue Cross Blue Shield clients the lowest rates. As a result, a Blue Cross Blue Shield 4 client seeking medical attention for anything from a broken bone to a heart attack was contractually entitled to a hospital's lowest price for the specific medical attention. 5 Generally, an MFN is a contractual provision used in buyer-seller relationships that requires the seller to provide the buyer with prices as low as or lower than those paid by any other buyer. The clause has been used in a variety 6 of business contexts, from contracts guaranteeing manufacturers the lowest price on raw materials to certain licensing and royalty agreements. In the health care 7 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:823 industry, MFNs are inserted by health insurance companies into "payor-provider" contracts, which are agreements that add health care providers, such as hospitals or medical specialists, to a health insurance company's provider network. In this 8 setting, a health insurance company-the buyer-uses an MFN to ensure the health care provider-seller-will not charge the buyer more than any other patient for health care services. Aside from guaranteeing the most competitive 9 health care prices, MFNs may also reduce Blue Cross Blue Shield's transactional costs that accrue from constantly negotiating with health care providers for the lowest prices-savings that may be passed on to the insurer's clients, who are the end consumers. Since such an arrangement confers an immense, unilateral 10 benefit on the insurance company-the buyer-, a significant amount of market power is typically required of the insurance company before it is able to negotiate the inclusion of an MFN into its payor-provider contracts.
11
In 2007, Blue Cross Blue Shield possessed the requisite market power to impose MFNs on Michigan's health care providers. The insurance company 12 covered more than sixty percent of Michigan's commercially insured population; roughly nine times as many as its next largest competitor. Due to this extensive 13 customer base, Michigan's health care providers could simply not afford to be excluded from Blue Cross Blue Shield's network and were forced to accept a deal on Blue Cross Blue Shield's terms. This led to the inclusion of MFNs in 14 payor-provider contracts with seventy of Michigan's 131 general acute care hospitals, which operated more than forty percent of the hospital beds in the entire state. 15 Blue Cross Blue Shield profited significantly from these agreements; however, the manner in which it leveraged the MFNs suggests the savings were not exactly passed through to its customers. In fact, some argued the provisions 16 were detrimental to Michigan's health care market. Eventually, the Antitrust providers in its network prices that were above fair market value and then leveraging the MFNs to ensure that potential new market entrants were forced to pay at least the same rates. The complaint maintained the maneuver resulted in 22 squeezing the profit margins of smaller health insurance companies and crowding out any new market entrants who could not pay the inflated prices. 23 However, despite Blue Cross Blue Shield's alleged misconduct, the court rejected the argument the use of MFNs in payor-provider contracts is per se illegal and dismissed the case. By dismissing the case, the court held MFN 24 provisions are not necessarily illegal; however, the complaint demonstrated a few of the primary concerns regarding MFN provisions. For example, although insurance companies undeniably benefit from including MFNs in payor-provider contracts, the provisions are easily abused, may have anticompetitive effects on the health care market, and raise significant antitrust issues. contracting directly with the health care provider to offer health insurance to its employees, it may include an MFN in the agreement. 41 Secondly, independent of Indiana's anti-MFN statute, a "safety net of legality" is created by ERISA's preemption provision. ERISA is a federal 42 regulation that covers all plans offered to employees by their employers, known as "employee benefit plans." In order to regulate all employee benefit plans 43 nationwide in a consistent and predictable manner, ERISA includes a powerful preemption provision that insulates employee benefit plans from state laws. The 44 preemption provision states ERISA "shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan." 45 Since certain employer-provided health insurance policies qualify as "employee benefit plans," they are subject to ERISA and its preemption power. Thus, a "safety net of legality" is created that ensures an Indiana employer may use MFNs in its contracts with health care providers. 
A. Indiana's Anti-MFN Statute and the Employer Exemption
The Indiana General Assembly refused to enact Indiana Code section 27-8-11-9 (the "anti-MFN statute") three times before it was finally passed with the support of Indiana's medical community, small businesses, and those Indiana insurance companies with small degrees of market penetration. The statute 46 states, in relevant part:
(b) An agreement between an insurer and a provider under this chapter may not contain a provision that: (1) prohibits, or grants the insurer an option to prohibit, the provider from contracting with another insurer to accept lower payment for health care services than the payment specified in the agreement; (2) requires, or grants the insurer an option to require, the provider to accept a lower payment from the insurer if the provider agrees with another insurer to accept lower payment for health care services; (3) requires, or grants the insurer an option of, termination or renegotiation of the agreement if the provider agrees with another insurer to accept lower payment for health care services; or (4) requires the provider to disclose the provider's reimbursement rates under contracts with other insurers. 47 The statute clearly and explicitly bans the use of MFN provisions in all agreements "between an insurer and a provider." However, an examination of 48 the statute's definition of "insurer" reveals that the anti-MFN statute explicitly exempts Indiana employers from adhering to its provisions ("employer exemption"). 
B. The "Safety Net of Legality" Provided by ERISA and Its Preemption Provision
In addition to the protection provided by the employer exemption in Indiana's anti-MFN statute, Indiana employers may ensure their use of MFNs in contracts with health care providers is permissible by structuring their health care plans to fall under ERISA's jurisdiction. ERISA governs every "employee benefit plan" offered by employers nationwide and is silent on the issue of MFNs. In 56 order to promote consistent enforcement, employee benefit plans are subject to federal ERISA regulations, which preempt State laws that "now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan." Therefore, an employer who structures its 57 health insurance policy as an ERISA employee benefit plan may establish a "safety net of legality" that occurs when ERISA preempts Indiana's anti-MFN statute.
An ERISA "Employee Benefit Plan" is defined as "any employee benefit plan . . . established or maintained . . . (1) by any employer engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce; or (2) by any employee organization or organizations representing employees engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce." This extremely broad 58 definition covers a large spectrum of programs, from employee pensions to life insurance. It also includes a health insurance plan that is already popular with many Indiana employers: self-funded health insurance policies. which party-the employer or an insurance company-will pay the health care bills incurred by the plan's participants. Restated, the chosen plan designates 61 which party bears the risk an employee enrolled in the plan will unexpectedly require substantial and expensive health care costs.
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In fully insured health insurance policies, the insurance company assumes both roles. Fully insured plans are well known to the average consumer as the 63 traditional form of group health insurance. In the typical fully insured health 64 plan, the employer pays an insurance company a fixed annual rate for coverage, as well as a fluctuating monthly premium for each employee that chooses to enroll in the plan. The insurance company is then responsible for paying the 65 health care costs accrued by the enrolled employees depending on the benefits provided by the specific policy. In such a fully insured plan, the insurance 66 company profits by pocketing margins created by the difference in the premiums collected and the health care costs actually incurred. Therefore, the insurance 67 company is essentially gambling that the premiums it collects are higher than the employees' health care costs. In this way, the insurance company assumes the risk an enrollee may face significant and expensive health care needs in the future (often described as "catastrophic claims"). 68 Conversely, self-funded health insurance policies are health insurance plans in which "the risk [of catastrophic claims] is borne by the employer." In self-69 funded plans, employers pay their employee's health care bills directly, assuming the risk of catastrophic claims but saving on the premium payments an insurance company would collect in a fully insured plan. In addition to cost savings, self-70 funded plans provide employers with the ability to assume the increased level of risk with a variety of benefits. The primary benefit of self-funded plans is that 71 they are extremely flexible and are known for their ability to give employers more flexibility in controlling employee benefit plans. Because self-funded plans 60 Traditionally, these benefits were only considered to be available to large employers with the financial means to shoulder the significant administrative costs of operating a self-funded health insurance plan in-house, as well as the risk of possibly crippling catastrophic claims. However, the emergence of 75 independent specialized services such as "third party administrators" and "stop loss insurance" have expanded the availability of self-funded plans to businesses of all sizes. A Third Party Administrator ("TPA") is "[a]n individual or firm 76 hired by an employer to handle claims processing, pay providers, and manage other functions related to the operation of health insurance." Independent TPAs 77 allow employers to outsource administrative functions and take advantage of selffunded plans without encumbering its own infrastructure.
Likewise, stop loss insurance coverage makes self-funded health plans an option for smaller employers by allowing these employers to shift some of the risk of a catastrophic claim to an independent insurance company. In a stop loss 78 insurance policy, an employer pays the majority of health care costs incurred by its employees; however, if expenses surpass a pre-determined threshold (such as a "catastrophic claim"), then the insurance company covers the remainder of the medical bills. This service effectively "minimizes [the employer's] exposure to 79 unlimited benefits liability" and allows employers to take advantage of a selffunded plan's flexibility. 80 However, for the purposes of this Note, the definitive feature of self-funded health insurance plans is the contracts with health care providers are entered into by the employer, rather than an insurance company, thereby making the employer exemption of Indiana's anti-MFN statute applicable. Another important characteristic is employer-provided self-funded plans are included within 72. Id. at 540 (noting a narrow example of this would be a small employer with only single, male employees; therefore, excluding pregnancy benefits from its plan's coverage).
73. To accomplish its goals of promoting uniformity and ensuring the effectiveness of ERISA's provisions, Congress created "an area of exclusive federal concern," thus insulating ERISA from state laws. The preemption 85 provision was intended to eliminate the inefficiencies of plans having to comply with conflicting state and federal laws, particularly in the case of multi-state employers. Specifically, Congress was concerned employers confronted with 86 the high administrative costs that result from complex compliance issues would be forced to either reduce benefits or eliminate employee benefit programs altogether. Therefore, Congress protected this "area of exclusive federal 87 concern" by granting ERISA a broad preemption power, codified in 29 U.S.C. § 1144 ("the preemption provision"). This expansive preemption provision 88 ensures that ERISA is not compromised by state law and is the foundation for the "safety net of legality" that can be taken advantage of by Indiana employers. Confirming that ERISA's preemption provision provides Indiana employers who utilize MFNs with an additional "safety net" requires a three-step analytical process. Collectively, these three steps are used to walk a tightrope between 89 enabling ERISA to operate effectively and refraining from infringing on states' 81. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2012); see generally FMC Corp., v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990). Note, however, a stop-loss insurance coverage is not protected from ERISA's preemption power.
82. See supra Part I. 83. A welfare plan is defined as "one which provides to employees 'medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability [or] death,' whether these benefits are provided 'through the purchase of insurance or otherwise.'" Metro. Life Ins. Co as the "Deemer Clause," the third step restricts the application of the savings clause by preventing a state from "deeming" an employer an "insurance company" solely so the employer's actions will be characterized as "within the insurance industry," thereby becoming subject to the savings clause. The
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Deemer Clause is a reaction to states' attempts at forcing employers to comply with state laws that only "purport to regulate insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust companies, or investment companies." Essentially, it 96 prevents state governments from indirectly regulating employee benefit plans. 97 An application of this three-step analytical process demonstrates employerprovided self-funded health insurance plans are protected from Indiana's anti-MFN statute by ERISA's preemption provision. The savings clause would typically save Indiana's anti-MFN statute from preemption because it relates to the insurance industry; however, the Deemer Clause prohibits the savings clause from extending to Indiana employers who issue self-funded health plans. It 98 prevents the Indiana General Assembly from deeming an Indiana employer an insurer simply to apply the savings clause. Therefore, the anti-MFN statute, which covers "agreement[s] between an insurer and a provider," is inapplicable.
a.
Step one: ERISA's broad general preemption.-ERISA's general and extremely broad preemption language is found in 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (a). It states 99 that, "[e]xcept as provided in [the Savings Clause], the provisions of this subchapter . . . shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title . . . ." A self-funded health insurance plan clearly meets § 1003(a)'s 100 definition of an employee benefit plan, which is described as "any employee benefit plan . . . established or maintained (1) is true regardless of whether the law was designed to be connected with an employee benefit plan or the connection is merely indirect. However, the Court 103 also said this standard was not unlimited and can in some cases be "too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner to warrant a finding that the law 'relates to' the plan." It expanded on this in Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, when it held that to 104 determine whether a state law has a "connection with" an employee benefit plan, a court must look: (1) to ERISA's objectives, and to what extent Congress intended it to survive; and (2) to the nature of the effect that the state law had on ERISA plans.
105
The U.S. Supreme Court's analytical framework may be used to show Indiana's anti-MFN statute has a strong enough "connection with" ERISA provisions to be sufficiently preempted by § 1144 (a)'s general language. First, 106 case law has demonstrated one of ERISA's primary goals is to allow employers "to establish a uniform administrative scheme, which provides a set of standard procedures to guide processing of claims and disbursement of benefits." Since 107 Indiana's anti-MFN statute would require multi-state employers to include or exclude MFN clauses in payor-provider contracts depending on the state in which employers are contracting, the statute's practical effect would be to prohibit one of ERISA's main goals: uniformity in employee benefit plan requirements. 108 Therefore, the anti-MFN statute clearly has a "sufficient connection" with an employee benefit plan and falls within the broad "preemption presumption" in step one of ERISA's preemption analyses. However, Indiana's anti-MFN statute is also within the scope of the savings clause.
b.
Step Court held for a state law to "regulate insurance" they do not have to "alter or control the actual terms of insurance policies . . . it suffices that they substantially affect the risk pooling arrangement between insurer and insured." The Court 118 also stated in a footnote:
ERISA's saving clause does not require that a state law regulate insurance companies or even the business of insurance to be saved from pre-emption; it need only be a "law . . . which regulates insurance" . . . Applying the Miller test, it is clear that Indiana's anti-MFN law sufficiently "regulates insurance." Therefore, although Indiana's statute is subject to 121 ERISA's broad preemption provision in 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (a), it is also "saved" for "regulating insurance" by the savings clause in 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A). (1) agreements that are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and are illegal per se; and (2) agreements that are interpreted by the court to be unreasonable as applied, using the rule of reason standard. An agreement is characterized as per se illegal, no further inquiry is required into either the agreement's actual effect on the market nor the intentions of the contracting parties. This lack of required analysis by a court is due to the tedious and 154 expensive nature of a rule of reason analysis and the inherent anticompetitive characteristics of the specific type of agreement-a court essentially finds that a category is so intrinsically anticompetitive that it is a waste of the court's time and resources to conduct a full analysis. Conversely, the rule of reason standard is applied to those agreements that are ambiguous and whose procompetitive effects may or may not outweigh its anticompetitive effects. It requires a fact-155 specific test in which the fact finder takes into account the totality of the circumstances surrounding the agreement such as the level of market power possessed by the contracting parties and whether the restraint has an anti or procompetitive effect on the relevant geographic or product markets. 156 The use of MFNs in payor-provider contracts is not per se illegal because there are enough procompetitive benefits of using MFNs to require a weighing Division, which has filed six of the seven aforementioned cases, attempted to clarify its policy regarding MFNs by emphasizing two prerequisites necessary for MFNs to be found as having an anticompetitive effect. 164 First, the employer using the MFN must have such a significant amount of market power "that almost all providers believe that they must participate in that payer's plan." Secondly, the employer utilizing the MFN must account for a 165 "sufficiently large percentage" of the participating providers' total business, so it would be unprofitable for those providers to contract with others whom are 157 Thus, before an agreement between an Indiana employer and a health care provider will even be considered to have possible antitrust implications by the Antitrust Division, the number of participants in the employer's self-funded plan must contain greater than a thirty-five percent share in the health care provider marketplace and be so significant that almost all providers believe they must participate in the plan. It is worth noting that no federal court has held the inclusion of MFNs in payor-provider contracts violates antitrust laws. This is far from a declaration could hardly be seen as a prohibition on MFNs, as this relaxed standard of "plausibly alleg[ing]" anticompetitive effects is far removed from proving an MFN's anticompetitive effects, which a federal agency or private party must do to obtain a verdict.
In summary, an Indiana employer may glean three important takeaways from potential litigation surrounding section one of the Sherman Antitrust Act. First, as long as the employer does not account for a "sufficiently large percentage" of providers' total business, (or more than thirty-five percent), then it will not be looked at by the federal antitrust enforcement agencies. Second, even if a 172 federal antitrust enforcement agency (such as the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice) does investigate an Indiana employer based on its market share, the agency must point to the MFNs specific effect, rather than merely to its general use, in order for its complaint to survive a rule of reason analysis. effects by the employer's MFN, the court must still balance those possible anticompetitive effects with any procompetitive effects the MFN may have. 174 Combined, these takeaways signify if an MFN is used in a procompetitive manner, an Indiana employer is safe from triggering antitrust implications under section one of the Sherman Act.
B. The Sherman Antitrust Act, Section Two: Monopolization and Attempted Monopolization
Section two of the Sherman Antitrust Act provides that "[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony." 175 Section two's primary purpose is to prohibit the acquisition or maintenance of monopolies, thereby preserving a competitive environment which "spurs companies to reduce costs, improve the quality of their products, invent new products, educate consumers, and engage in a wide range of other activity that benefits consumer welfare." 176 However, as in section one of the Sherman Antitrust Act, the wording in section two of the statute is vague and relies on judicial interpretation. Courts 177 have extrapolated from its wording two general types of conduct section two prohibits: actual monopolization and the attempt, or conspiracy to, monopolize. An "attempted monopolization" is proven by demonstrating "(1)
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CONCLUSION
When used in the health care industry, Most Favored Nation Clauses are extremely polarizing contract provisions. When applied in a procompetitive manner, they can lead to lower prices for health care and the elimination of certain transactional costs that result from constant negotiations with health care providers.
However, MFNs have also been used for anticompetitive purposes. Insurance companies have used them as tools to influence the price of health insurance by setting price floors, eliminating the incentive for health care providers to grant any other parties discounts for services and forming barriers-of-entry to potential competitors in the health insurance marketplace. These anticompetitive effects have led federal antitrust enforcement agencies to file causes of action against some insurers who use MFNs and have even led several states to pass laws banning MFNs in payor-provider contracts.
The Indiana General Assembly itself enacted an anti-MFN statute, Indiana Code section 27-8-11-9, in the fall of 2007. However, two specific statutory provisions exist that allow Indiana employers to continue to use MFNs when providing self-funded health insurance plans to their employees. First, Indiana's anti-MFN statute includes an employer exemption, which exempts employers from its requirements so long as the employer is contracting to provide health insurance to its employees. Secondly, when employers structure their health 200 plans as a self-funded employee benefit plan, ERISA's preemption provision preempts all Indiana laws that relate to it, including the anti-MFN statute. 201 Together, these two independent statutory provisions ensure Indiana employers may legally use MFNs when contracting with health care providers to provide self-funded health care plans to their employees.
Finally, although there are undoubtedly antitrust implications that arise when MFNs are used in an anticompetitive manner, Indiana employers may avoid making these mistakes by having a thorough understanding of the recent trends in antitrust law. Specifically, federal enforcement agency guidelines and recent case law suggest when used in a procompetitive manner or by a business with less than a certain amount of market power, MFNs may be used without raising antitrust implications.
The bottom line is that the decision to use MFNs in contracts with health care providers is one that must be made by Indiana employers on a case-by-case basis, depending on both situational and economic factors. Regardless, should the decision to use MFNs make strategic sense, employers may legally use them.
